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Abstract

Co-edited by Peter Hakim, President Emeritus, Inter-American Dialogue and Genaro Arriagada, NonResident Senior Fellow, Inter-American Dialogue, this issue examines energy as a priority issue for nearly all
Latin American and Caribbean countries and considers its impact on regional integration and both foreign
and domestic policy. Articles present opportunities and challenges facing the region, as well as
recommendations for addressing the energy issue in Latin America in a strategic, constructive and effective
manner.
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WHO?
The Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies is a dynamic partnership
between the Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) at Florida International University (FIU)
and the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at the University of Miami (UM). Designated
as a U.S. Department of Education National Resource Center on Latin America, the Miami
Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies is recognized as one of the nation’s top
institutions for the study of Latin America and the Caribbean.

WHERE?
From its incomparable location in Miami, the Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean
Studies creates unique and innovative opportunities for South Florida’s leading universities and
the communities they serve.

WHAT?
Built on more than 25 years of UM and FIU faculty, student and community collaboration, the
Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies reaffirms South Florida as THE hub
for political, commercial, cultural, and scholarly exchange between the U.S. and its neighbors
to the South, and strategically positions Miami at the center of a broader global dialogue that
connects the rest of the world to Latin America and the Caribbean.

HOW?
The Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies spearheads cutting-edge
research, expands and strengthens international linkages throughout the hemisphere, supports
cultural and academic exchange, promotes outreach, training, and networking for a broad
community of scholars, K-12 educators, journalists, governmental officials, and the business
sector, and develops and implements projects designed to strengthen societies and improve
the lives of people throughout the hemisphere.
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E D I T O R

Dear Hemisphere readers:
The energy situation in the Americas, not to say the world, is changing rapidly. Developments in the Middle East
continue to surprise us daily. Contrary to popular belief, however, the principal US oil suppliers are countries not in the
Middle East or Africa, but rather the Western Hemisphere: Venezuela and Mexico.
China and India are increasing their energy demands faster than most analysts predicted and are assiduously courting
suppliers for the long haul. The energy market has become a seller’s market and is likely to continue to be one in the
coming years. Latin America’s oil and gas reserves, as well as the region’s hydroelectric potential and relatively low overall
consumption, put most of the countries in this region in an enviable position when facing their energy future. The
landscape, however, is rapidly changing.
Traditional Latin American energy powerhouses are seeing a rapid decline in their energy production (Mexico), while
new oil (Brazil) and gas (Bolivia) reserves are being discovered in places impossible to reach with available technology
until very recently. Despite great technological advances, the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico showed the world how
fragile the ecological balance can be and the consequences of accidents, whether manmade or natural.
The increasing double threat of global warming and climate change has introduced new variables to the energy
equation. Price is no longer the only factor driving the search for alternative energy sources. Protecting the right to a clean
environment for future generations is another very important determinant.
This year we have devoted our annual issue of Hemisphere to the problem of Energy Challenges in the Americas. I would
like to thank my colleagues and friends from the Inter-American Dialogue Energy Task Force for agreeing to join forces with
LACC to produce this volume.
In addition to the pieces authored by the Inter-American Dialogue Energy Task Force members we have included
commentaries by two FIU faculty members and one graduate student. Some authors address broad themes; others focus on
specific issues, regions or countries. As usual the idea is not to give you, the reader, an exhaustive view, but to invite you to
explore the issues from new comparative and cross-disciplinary perspectives.
With this issue of Hemisphere LACC begins a longer debate on energy in the Americas. This year’s Journalists and
Editors Workshop on Latin America and the Caribbean, LACC’s traditional yearly gathering of media professionals
covering Latin America and the Caribbean, will be devoted to discussing different aspects of this topic. Some of the issues
we will address include opportunities and challenges from the perspectives of the haves and have-nots, those posed by the
new global and regional geopolitics of energy, and the diminishing costs of alternative energy sources.
Many people have contributed to this issue of Hemisphere and I am grateful to them all. In addition to the Dialogue’s
Energy Task Force members I would like to thank Peter Hakim, Chris Cote and Alexis Arthur from the Inter-American
Dialogue, and Liesl Picard, Andreina Fernández and Alisa Newman from LACC.
Thank you,
Cristina Eguizábal
Director
Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
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FROM THE GUEST EDITORS
Dear readers:
The fact that energy has become a priority issue for nearly all Latin American nations was our central motivation
for establishing the Inter-American Dialogue’s Energy Policy Group. This assertion needs no explanation; energy is a
critical element in every country’s thinking about and planning for its future. Energy has become a key factor affecting
the pace and success of regional integration processes and is shaping the foreign policies and domestic choices of many
Latin American countries.
Moreover, the problems associated with energy are subject to rapid change. They must be tracked and analyzed on
a regular basis. In the past year, we have witnessed wide swings in the price of energy. Latin American countries are
giving renewed attention to nuclear power; Brazil has taken major steps to prepare for the exploitation of newly found
petroleum deposits and is building the world’s third largest dam; and poor management is leading to declining oil
production in Mexico and Venezuela, the region’s largest exporters.
In country after country, energy has emerged as a central political issue. Politics and ideology (as much as
calculations of national interest) are shaping and constraining energy decisions, and government choices about energy
are affecting the national politics and foreign policies of many nations. In the absence of new discoveries, Mexico’s oil
reserves are rapidly being depleted; yet, it is politically risky for any Mexican government to consider allowing foreign
investment into the petroleum sector. Venezuela’s regional influence depends heavily on its ability to assist the resourcepoor countries of Central America and the Caribbean to meet their energy needs. Protests and demonstrations, which
forced Bolivia to rescind essential price increases in natural gas, have weakened the government of Evo Morales. Even
Chevron’s court battles in Ecuador are as much about politics as they are about the environment.
Decisions about energy production and use in any one Latin American country affect the economies and politics of
many other nations. Brazil’s largest city, São Paulo, depends on natural gas exports from Bolivia, while the Bolivian
economy relies on Brazilian purchases. Argentina has a similar link to Bolivia. Chile depends on natural gas imports
from its neighbors Peru, Argentina and Bolivia but cannot fully count on a reliable supply. It is planning to turn to
much higher priced LNG imports and perhaps develop a nuclear energy capacity.
We are pleased to have this opportunity to showcase the initial work of the Energy Policy Group, which was
launched in 2009 with the cooperation and support of the Inter-American Development Bank. The group’s
approximately 20 participants include energy experts and political and economic analysts, who meet to discuss the
most important energy policy challenges confronting the region’s governments, offer balanced analysis of issues and
choices, and develop ideas and approaches for addressing them in constructive ways. Many of the articles in this issue
of Hemisphere were prepared by members of the group during its first year of operation. The Dialogue also publishes
the Latin America Energy Advisor, a highly regarded weekly newsletter that offers up-to-date information and timely
analysis of hemispheric energy issues.
We very much hope that you enjoy this issue of Hemisphere and find the conclusions and recommendations that
have emerged from the Dialogue’s policy group to be instructive and useful. We owe a debt of gratitude to FIU’s
Latin American and Caribbean Center and its director, Cristina Eguizábal, for giving us this opportunity to present
the group’s work. We would also like to acknowledge and thank Alexis Arthur and Chris Cote of the Dialogue staff
for the editing and other contributions they made to assembling this issue. It would not have been possible without
their help.
Sincerely,
Peter Hakim
President Emeritus
Inter-American Dialogue
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Leading Energy Policy Issues
in Latin America
By Genaro Arriagada

E

nergy is a leading world
concern. A fundamental
factor in determining
the might and weight
of nations is the skill
with which they handle energy
policy. Tensions among states are
increasingly linked to the security
of energy supplies, prices and
transportation. In this context,
analyses from the viewpoint of
politics and strategic and power
considerations among states gain
new importance in addressing
energy issues.
Compared to other world
regions, Latin America’s energy
mix reveals special circumstances,
challenges, problems and policies.
The table illustrates the percentage
of total consumption by energy
source and region.
Latin America is an area rich in oil,
hydroelectric power and gas, with
enormous reserves and production
that exceeds consumption, making
it a net energy exporter. By contrast,
the share of coal and nuclear energy
in the mix is very small.
Since energy policy should be
based on the use of all sources rather
than a single one, a view of the
overall energy mix is fundamental to
discussing and formulating longterm policy. Environmental concern
about greenhouse gas emissions has
given new momentum to oncecontroversial energy sources, such
as dams and nuclear power plants.
Such considerations should not
obscure economic factors essential
to growth, for the cleanest energy

6
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Energy Mix 2009
Oil

Gas

Coal

Nuclear

Hydro

Total

North America

38.5

27.6

20.0

8.0

5. 9

100.0

South & Central
America

45.5

21.5

4.0

0.8

28.2

100.0

Europe-Eurasia

33.0

34.4

16.5

9.5

6.6

100.0

Middle East

51.0

47.2

1.4

0.0

0.4

100.0

Africa

40.0

23.4

29.7

0.8

6.1

100.0

Asia-Pacific

29.1

10.8

51.9

3.0

5.2

100.0

World Total

34.8

23.8

29.3

5.5

6.6

100.0

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2010.

sources—wind and solar—are
among the most expensive. A purely
economic logic favors investment in
coal, which is the cheapest source
but also the most polluting.
Between now and 2030—
assuming that energy consumption
rises 60%, the mix remains clean,
and the increase in energy costs is
minor—Latin America should set
the following general energy policy
goals: (1) maintain the current share
of hydroelectric power; (2) slightly
reduce the oil share; (3) maintain
the natural gas share; (4) reduce
the coal share; (5) reduce the role
of traditional biomass, especially
if associated with extreme poverty;
(6) maintain or, ideally, increase the
nuclear energy share; and (7) increase
the Non-Conventional Renewable
Energy (NCRE) contribution to 1015% of the mix.

Analysis of Energy Sources
Having set the general framework,
it is important to analyze the
different components of the energy
grid. These are at varying degrees of
development, pose distinct problems
and opportunities, and should be
addressed through different policies.
Oil. Excluding the Middle East,
Latin America is the region where oil
makes the largest contribution to the
fuel pool, even more than in the “oiladdicted” United States. South and
Central America, the Caribbean and
Mexico together account for 15.8%
of proven reserves and 12.8% of
world production, which compares
favorably to their 8.8% share of
consumption.
Recently, however, highly favorable
conditions have given way to
uncertainty due to stagnating, even
declining production in most of

Feature

Itaipu’s Brazilian General Director, Jorge Miguel Samek, speaks to journalists about the controversial
hydroelectric dam, which is co-owned by Paraguay and Brazil, during a press conference at the
São Paulo State Industry Federation (FIESP) headquarters in São Paulo, Brazil, on May 27, 2009.
Photo: Mauricio Lima/AFP/Getty Images.

South America and Mexico. The
Mexican state underfunds the oil
sector, and oil reforms approved by
the Mexican Congress are seen as too
limited. In Venezuela, too, the oil
situation is deteriorating rapidly.
Brazil, in contrast, has emerged
as a success story when it comes to
oil exploration and production. In
1997 it accounted for two-thirds
of South America’s crude imports,
but by 2009 it was self-sufficient in
energy and ready to join the exclusive
club of oil-exporting countries. Its
results are so favorable that by the
end of the decade it will probably
overtake Venezuela and Mexico as
the hemisphere’s leading producer. In
Brazil, an active state policy coexists
with a company, Petrobras, which
combines the features of state-owned
and private enterprise within a
regulatory framework that allows it to
avoid the dilemmas of overly liberal
policies or unyielding statism.
Outside of Brazil, Latin America’s
oil future is under threat unless

there is an effort to increase sector
efficiency, particularly in Mexico,
Argentina, Venezuela and Ecuador.
Natural gas. The contribution
of gas to the regional energy mix is
close to the world average: 22.2%
compared to a global average of
23.7%. When it comes to reserves
and production, however, gas is less
satisfactory than oil. Latin America
owns 4.1% of proven reserves and
production matches consumption,
6.3% of the world total. Venezuela
and Bolivia have immense reserves
but sector development is lagging.
Brazil, Peru and Trinidad & Tobago
have more successfully managed their
gas sectors.
The South American liquefied
natural gas (LNG) market
started in 2008 following the
announcement of plans to build at
least seven regasification plants. This
strengthened the overall regional
energy situation but weakened
integration efforts. A more optimistic
way to view the relationship between

LNG and integration is to say
that classic gas integration—via
pipelines—is on the way out, but
the door has opened for integration
on the basis of LNG, with close
cooperation between neighboring
countries: Chile and Peru, Brazil and
Argentina.
Coal. This will continue to be the
fastest-growing fuel and its share in
the Latin American mix —a low
one-seventh of the world average—
is likely to increase, driven by low
costs and difficulties in developing
hydroelectric and nuclear energy.
The role of coal is small and limited
to Brazil, Chile and Colombia,
which account for 85% of regional
consumption. At the same time,
however, Central and South America
represent the world area where coal
consumption is growing the fastest.
This increase will tend to muddy a
comparatively clean energy mix.
Hydroelectric power. Latin
America, South America in
particular, is the world’s richest
hydroelectric region, with
22% of the global total for this
resource and four times the world
average. However, opposition by
environmental groups to new dams
has led to conflicts in Chile, Brazil,
Guatemala, Mexico, Honduras,
El Salvador, Peru and other
countries. Such confrontations
pit environmentalists, native
communities and large
international NGOs opposed to
dams (and nuclear energy or even
oil development) against large
corporations, governments and
multilateral lenders that support
development based on such factors
as cost and security or clean energy
concerns. Proponents argue that
nuclear power is a sustainable option
for a continent that has decided to
halt hydroelectric development and
should not rely on coal.
Nuclear energy. Nuclear energy
comprises 6% of the world energy
Hemisphere Volume 20
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Itaipu’s Paraguayan General Director, Carlos Mateo Balmelli. Photo: Mauricio Lima/AFP/Getty Images.

mix, but in Latin America it accounts
for less than 1%. Since 2006,
governments have espoused the
necessity of developing this sector
given such factors as climate change,
high oil prices, and dwindling
reserves and production. Brazil
and Argentina have announced
new nuclear plants, the debate in
Mexico is growing more strident,
and Uruguay has set up a bipartisan
commission to review the issue.
Chile may soon become the fourth
Latin American country to integrate
nuclear energy into the mix. In
Venezuela, the Chávez administration
has been flirting with nuclear energy
that uses Russian and Iranian
technology.
Traditional biomass. The oldest
form of energy is traditional biomass
for heating, lighting and cooking.
Its use is often associated with
extreme poverty, and some 100
million Latin Americans rely on
traditional biomass to meet their
basic energy needs. Firewood, the
most characteristic use of biomass,
is hard to quantify, but it accounts
8
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for a very high share of the mix in
the poor nations of Central America
and the Caribbean. Yet, firewood
could be used rationally in countries
with vast forests, the technology to
process farm waste, and thoughtful
forest management plans. One of the
Millennium Development Goals is
to give the poor, who otherwise have
only traditional biomass, access to
modern energy sources.
Non-Conventional Renewable
Energy. This includes run-of-river
hydroelectric plants, wind, solar,
geothermal, and non-traditional
biomass such as sugar cane, cornbased and cellulosic ethanol. While
they currently contribute only 2%
of the Latin American mix, these
sources are critical to addressing
climate change and will be a focal
point of future debate. Clean to
varying degrees, some of these
sources have non-trivial negative
effects. Worldwide use of nonconventional renewable energy has
been rising rapidly but its overall
contribution remains scant. In
general, its development hinges on

subsidy policies that poor and even
middle-income economies, such
as those of Latin America, cannot
afford to any significant extent. Still,
there have been success stories with
some forms of renewable energy in
individual countries.
Non-conventional hydrocarbons.
The hemisphere holds remarkable
possibilities for development of
“non-conventional” or “tough”
hydrocarbons, including Canada’s
tar sands or the ultra heavy oils of
Venezuela’s Orinoco Basin, which
could total as much as double
the reserves of Saudi Arabia. The
technical and financial issues in
developing these resources are
enormous and the environmental
impact is also being questioned,
particularly with regard to tar
sands. Interestingly, high-profile
observers note that the distinction
between conventional and nonconventional oil is irrelevant since
at the end of the day, any oil that
markets can integrate in terms of
cost and price is conventional. In
this sense, the ultra heavy oils of
the Orinoco have better prospects
than Canada’s tar sands.
Energy Regions in the Hemisphere
Specific local circumstances and
issues call for different policies,
making it most expedient to view
the hemisphere as not one zone
but three: Central America and the
Caribbean; South America; and
North America, including Mexico,
the United States and Canada.
Central America and the
Caribbean encompass 23 nations
with an energy deficit. Only
Guatemala and Cuba produce some
oil, although not enough to meet
domestic demand. Oil accounts
for more than 70% of the energy
mix in many of these nations. They
possess limited refining capacities,
compounding dependence. The
Central American and Caribbean

Feature

zone also has virtually no gas, except
for Trinidad and Tobago, home to
a significant exportable surplus.
Countries in this area possess
modest hydroelectric resources and
no access to nuclear energy in the
foreseeable future.
Energy is one of the bottlenecks
to growth in Central America and
the Caribbean. Oil becomes an
instrument of policy whenever a
strong imbalance of power emerges
between a country with a surfeit of
the resource and another that needs
it urgently. A state may prevail over
another in such a situation, reinforced
by subsidized prices or soft financing
terms. Within the hemisphere, this
zone is the most likely to experience
such relationships.
South America, in contrast, is rich
in energy resources. Exportable oil
surpluses are significant and proven
reserves very high. Venezuela, Bolivia
and Peru have vast gas reserves
and Brazil has recently reported
major discoveries. The hydroelectric
potential is enormous.
Major differences underlie this
scenario. Chile and Uruguay
are weakest, with large energy
shortfalls. Paraguay compensates its
shortcomings with the enormous
flow of electricity from large dams
on its borders with Brazil and
Argentina. All other countries
show positive balances but their
prospects differ. Brazil exemplifies
successful policy management while
Venezuela, Argentina and Ecuador
face declining production and
deteriorating energy sectors.
Latin America is the leading oil
exporter to the United States. The
US has a strong energy deficit, in
contrast to Mexico and Canada,
both with excess production. But
in Mexico, too, as we have noted,
energy production is on the decline.
In fact, North America is the region
of the world where the reserves-toproduction ratio is lowest.

Experience shows that energy security comes
from a diversification of the energy mix.

The disparities among these three
zones create both challenges and
opportunities for energy partnerships.
Security, Integration and
Geopolitics
Energy security is an elusive
concept. At its most basic it
requires an uninterrupted flow of
energy at a reasonable price.
While cuts in supply are the
foremost threat to security,
responsibility for them varies.
Many cuts occur for reasons
beyond the fault or control of
states or companies, although
cutting or threatening to cut the
energy supply may be used as an
instrument of political pressure.
Security can also be threatened
when a relatively more powerful
country sets an unfair price—either
too high (if it is a supplier) or
too low (if it is a consumer), thus
affecting a weaker nation. Cartels
may distort prices and, more
seriously, put conditions on supply.

Because of oil’s fungible nature,
its use for political purposes is
limited. Exports to one country
that are diverted to another will
simply be replaced with other
exports. The main concern is
whether the reduction of one
source can limit the global supply.
Natural gas is different, as about
70% of the gas supply does not
trade on the open market. Prices
and quantities are fixed in longterm contracts between countries
joined by a pipeline, creating
strict, reciprocal dependence
between exporter and importer.
The LNG market resembles the
oil market with the restriction
that it requires consumers to build
regasification plants.
Experience shows that higher
levels of energy security come
not from autarchy but from
diversification of the energy mix.
Security through diversification
and leverage of economic benefits
are among the factors that drive
integration. The leading forms of
energy integration are linkages
through gas pipelines and power
grids, but development of either in
Latin America is nascent at best.
In the case of natural gas, progress
has been hobbled by political or
geopolitical factors.
Nations such as China or India,
whose greatest concern is to secure
the energy supplies their growth
plans require, are increasingly
active in Latin America. As a
result, the geopolitical energy
equation must consider not just
large producers, but also and most
especially large overseas importers
and their investments in the area.
Prospects for energy security
would benefit greatly from a
regional accord or convention
designed to guarantee that energy
supplies will not be arbitrarily cut
by signatory states. This may not
be easy to achieve.
Hemisphere Volume 20
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Geopolitically, the presence of
extra-continental powers in the
region as well as tensions between
countries in the hemisphere should
be watched. Examples include:
(1) any vacuum created by the
suspension or reduction of projects
or promises made to countries and
governments by Venezuela, whose
oil slump may make fulfillment
impossible; (2) how the United
States will address eventual export
declines by Mexico and Venezuela;
and (3) tension between Brazil and
Bolivia over natural gas, not only
as related to Brazilian investments
in Bolivia, but also to those arising
from Brazil’s shift from deficit
to self-sufficiency and even to
exporting.
Savings, Prices and Public
Corporations
Any energy policy must consider
three fundamental elements:
efficiency, public corporations and
energy prices.
Energy efficiency is a priority
objective of a consistent policy.
Nearly all Latin American
countries have the ability to reduce
consumption at a reasonable cost
using measures within reach of
institutions and individuals. Energy
efficiency can yield a remarkably
high economic return and makes
a significant contribution toward
addressing climate change.
The largest players in the Latin
American energy arena, especially as
pertains to oil and gas, are National
Oil Companies (NOCs). Many
types of NOCs exist, varying by
corporate governance systems and
relations with the state, the private
sector and society. These models are
differentiated by the way NOCs
address rent take (production sharing
or concession-based contracts);
whether private participation exists
(in exploration and production, or
in company ownership); how and
10
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by whom the company is governed;
and the sector’s price policy. Brazil’s
Petrobras and Venezuela’s PDVSA are
examples of NOCs that address these
issues in divergent ways. NOCs are
likely to continue to dominate the
oil industry, especially in Mexico and
South America, and the quality of
their performance is a central energy
policy issue in Latin America.
The study of pricing and subsidy
policies is an issue of special
concern, as in Latin America these
can be an obstacle to consistent
energy policies. They interfere with
efficiency, discourage investment,
distort demand, do not always favor
the poorest and are a disincentive to
integration.
Subsidies, first cousins of pricing,
tend to be high in Latin America.
Venezuela, for instance, has some
of the world’s lowest gasoline
prices at enormous public cost.
Subsidies in Venezuela and Ecuador
represent 8.3% and 6.7% of GDP,
respectively. In some cases, subsidies
are high and lack transparency.
Their cost and financing are unclear
and they sometimes benefit the
affluent sectors of society. At the
same time, many non-conventional
renewable energy sources are
costly and can only be developed
if supported by subsidies. This
forces a discussion within a broad
perspective about the advisability
of investing in non-conventional
renewable energy without
impacting global economic growth
or diverting funds from other areas,
especially social needs.
Latin America and Climate
Change
Energy’s golden era of fossil fuels
is coming to an end. Humankind
has agreed that such a system is
unsustainable and must be stopped
due to high levels of carbon dioxide
emissions and their contribution to
climate change.

Latin America is not a large
contributor to greenhouse gas
emissions. The region adds a mere
6% to the world total, thanks to
low levels of industrial output and
public transportation emissions and
the weight of hydroelectric power in
the energy mix. The region’s greatest
potential contribution to climate
change is deforestation.
Regional energy policies have
already begun to address the climate
change challenge. Important
initiatives include hydroelectric
power and increased energy
efficiency. Nuclear energy too cannot
be ignored. The controversies over
its development, mostly political
(nuclear weapon proliferation) and
safety-related (risk of accident)
cannot obscure the fact that it is a
clean source of energy in terms of
greenhouse gas emissions.
To the above policies—whether any
or all are adopted—one must add
the fundamental role to be played by
non-conventional renewable energy
for its contribution to reducing
carbon dioxide emissions and fossil
fuel dependence. In general, nonconventional renewable energy
is expensive and hard to develop
without subsidy support. Production
costs have declined significantly
in recent years, however, and
there is active discussion about
international financing tools that
could make it accessible to countries
with lower relative development.
Latin American countries should
continue their efforts to invest in
non-conventional renewable energy
and develop new, more accessible
technologies. They should do so
with caution, however, ensuring that
development does not create a heavy
subsidy burden or pronounced
energy price increases. ■
Genaro Arriagada is a non-resident
senior fellow at the Inter-American
Dialogue.
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Energy Conflicts: A Growing
Concern in Latin America
By Patricia I. Vásquez

Protesters burning Christmas decorations in La Paz during a December 30, 2010 Gasolinazo protest against a decree by Bolivian President Evo Morales
to remove fuel subsidies. Photo by James Brunker/Latin Content/Getty Images.

T

he past decade
has witnessed a
proliferation of
energy projects in
Latin America. Many
have been central to the domestic
economic development plans of
governments; others have been
efforts to expand much-delayed
regional energy cooperation or
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consolidate a particular political
agenda across borders. As oil, gas
and hydroelectricity developments
have multiplied, so have conflicts
brought on by the negative political,
social, environmental and/or
economic externalities these projects
have generated.
While the dynamics of the
conflicts vary, the disputes at

national and local levels share
two underlying triggers: first,
Latin America’s deep-rooted
economic inequality and the
marginalization of certain societal
groups; and second, weak state
management of the revenue from
extractive industries. The region
succeeded in reducing inequality
levels in the last decade through
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improved education and increased
transfers to the poor. The quality
of the education the poor receive,
however, remains lower than that
attained by the top 10% of the
population, and redistribution is
minimal.
Persistent social and economic
differences in spite of increased
natural resource revenues in
producing countries create
frustration among the population
and are at the heart of energyrelated conflicts in Latin America.
These conflicts can be regional,
national or local. Regional
conflicts may be geopolitical; in
other words, related to the use of
energy, particularly oil, as a tool
for building political alliances
across borders, or border conflicts
related to unresolved, long-term
geographical frictions that hinder
energy cooperation between
nations. At the national level,
disputes stem from revenue conflicts
or clashes over the distribution of
natural resource revenues among
different ethnic or economic
groups. Local conflicts, in turn,
emerge from disputes within the
boundaries of areas under oil, gas or
hydroelectricity development.
Revenue and local conflicts
in particular build on historical
economic inequalities, especially
those affecting ethnic minorities,
in addition to weak institutional
frameworks and incomplete
implementation of the rule of
law. If not addressed properly
and in a timely manner, these
disputes may prove a challenge for
economic development models
based on extractive industries and
threaten the stability of democratic
governments.
Geopolitical Conflicts
Countries with large hydrocarbon
reserves sometimes leverage their
abundant resources to exert

political pressure on governments
dependent on energy imports. In
other situations, they may use the
wealth they accumulate through
exports to push broader political
or ideological agendas. Russia,
in its handling of gas supplies to
its European customers, fueled a
geopolitical conflict.
In Latin America, Venezuelan
President Hugo Chávez has used
his country’s ample oil and gas
reserves—80.5 billion barrels of
proven oil and 149 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas—to craft energy
cooperation initiatives that have
gained political allies. The specter
of supply interruption hangs over
those who do not share his ideology.
Chávez, a strong critic of the United
States, has also used his country’s
hydrocarbon might to challenge
opposition political views.
Border Conflicts
The most challenging border
conflict in the region is between
Bolivia and Chile and traces its
origin to more than century ago.
Since the War of the Pacific in
the 1880s, when Chile took away
Bolivia’s access to the Pacific
Ocean and left it landlocked,
Bolivians have maintained a
historic claim for return of
the coastline. That grievance
resurfaced in 2002 in the form
of massive popular opposition
in Bolivia to proposals to export
gas from new reserves through a
Chilean port. Violent uprisings
left dozens dead and ousted two
presidents—Gonzalo Sánchez de
Lozada in 2003 and his successor,
Carlos Mesa, in 2005—in what
became known as the “Gas War.”
When the private consortium
project to export Bolivia’s gas fell
through, the companies turned
to Peru instead. Had the original
export venture succeeded, it
would have turned Bolivia, South

America’s poorest country, into
the region’s first exporter of liquid
natural gas (LNG). Instead, that
privilege is enjoyed by Peru, which
became Latin America’s first LNG
exporter in 2010.
Revenue Conflicts
Estimates of Bolivia’s proven
natural gas reserves increased from
roughly 4.3 trillion cubic feet (tcf )
in 2000 to 27 tcf in 2009. Bolivia
has since been immersed in a
long period of political instability
as opposing groups struggle to
control gas resources. This struggle
has highlighted Bolivia’s persistent
class and ethnic differences: The
relatively small percentage of the
population of Spanish descent,
which controls the gas-rich
southeastern provinces of Tarija,
Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, has
squared off against the majority
indigenous population in the
country’s western highlands.
Underlying these differences are
historical economic inequalities, as
revenues from the eastern energyproducing departments have
usually failed to improve the living
standards of the poor in the rest of
the country.
In March 1990, a nationwide
march organized by the indigenous
population —Marcha por el
Territorio y la Dignidad (March
for Territory and Dignity)—
precipitated a series of laws
that increased recognition of
indigenous peoples’ rights and
their participation in the country’s
political life. Most important
among them was the Law of
Popular Participation, which
aimed to decentralize state power
by transferring political and
administrative control – and 20%
of the national budget – to local
municipalities.
The ascendancy of indigenous
President Evo Morales in 2006,
Hemisphere Volume 20
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which marked the first time Bolivia’s
majority indigenous population has
held political power, can be traced
to the push for inclusion that gained
momentum throughout the 1990s.
Morales also sought economic
power through greater control of the
profitable gas revenues in Bolivia’s
southeastern states. Rather than
acting as a balancing force, however,
his election deepened the divide
between the rich eastern lowlands
and the poor western highlands.
Morales set out to mandate a
redistribution of some 30% of gas
revenues to pay for social programs
for retirees, public school students
and other groups in the western
states. The move weakened the
autonomy movement, but many
governance inefficiencies continue
to create popular discontent.
Clientelism, rent-seeking practices
and corruption persist, particularly
within the state-owned oil company
(Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales de
Bolivia, or YPFB). Most important,
thriving gas revenues, which went
from $620 million in 2004 to $3.2
billion in 2008 (more as a function
of price than increased investments),
have failed to improve the livelihood
of most poor Bolivians.
Morales is trying to reach a
balance between the gas industry
and growing discontent among
indigenous groups who have yet
to enjoy the benefits of oil and
gas projects in their territories.
Pushing forward with hydrocarbon
development could erode Morales’s
indigenous support, open the way
to increased confrontation from his
own constituency and lead to the
development of local conflicts.
Local Conflicts
With conventional oil reserves
becoming harder to tap around
the world, a new and largely
undeveloped hydrocarbons
frontier in the heart of the
14
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Amazon has attracted the interest
of governments and oil and gas
producers. Similarly, attempts by
Latin American governments to
promote regional energy integration
and cooperation have resulted in
several new hydroelectric projects,
again mostly in the Amazon, as part
of the South American Regional
Infrastructure Integration Initiative
(IIRSA). The growing emergence of
oil, gas and hydroelectric projects

Protesters demonstrated against the construction
of the Belo Monte Dam in Brazil in front of
the Brazilian Permanent Mission to the United
Nations on April 28, 2010 in New York City.
Photo by Ben Hider/Getty Images.

in areas inhabited by indigenous
communities that are now more
effectively voicing their grievances
has spawned a proliferation of local
conflicts.
Energy-related local conflicts
are arguably the most difficult
to solve because of the variety of
actors involved, the complexity
of the issues that need resolution
and the intricacy of the applicable
legal framework. The potential for
such conflicts to spread depends on
several triggers:

1. The environmental and social
standards of the company
involved in the energy
projects. In the past decade,
Latin America has seen a
proliferation of small oil
and gas companies as well as
large national oil companies
(NOCs), some of which
observe less stringent social
and environmental safeguards
than the big majors.
2. The local community’s
level of radicalization and
opposition to the energy project.
Indigenous movements have
radicalized their actions and
gained more sophisticated
negotiating skills across
Latin America in the past
two decades. The extent of
opposition and radicalization
may depend on various
factors, among them local
culture, the historical
relationship between the
community and extractive
industries, and NGO
involvement.
3. The availability of institutional
mechanisms to mediate
conflicts. Latin American
countries often lack wellfunctioning institutions with
the capacity to effectively
mediate conflicts. An
exception to this rule is the
Peruvian Ombudsman’s
Office, which holds a high
degree of legitimacy among
all stakeholders and has
succeeded in de-escalating
conflicts. Local NGOs
usually have lower success
rates in mediating energyrelated conflicts.
4. The extent of law enforcement.
A constant source of energy
conflicts is laws that are
overlooked or improperly
applied, or an abundance
of overlapping rules that

Feature

make them confusing and
inoperative. Combined
with government failure to
comply with international
legal standards, such as
those imposed by the
ILO 169 Convention and
the UN Declaration of
the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, ineffective law
enforcement could lead
populations affected by
energy development to resort
to violence to seek answers to
their problems.
5. The existence of old grievances
or a history of negative
externalities related to
energy projects. In areas
with a history of social or
environmental damage from
previous energy projects,
local inhabitants tend to
more actively oppose similar
new developments. Such
communities also tend to be
more radicalized. The best
example is the widespread
opposition to new dams in
light of the deep scars left by
similar projects in the past.
6. The level and nature of
involvement of international
non-governmental
organizations in the conflict.
International NGOs
have grown in power and
sophistication over the last
20 years and are particularly
active in the Amazon. They
play a fundamental role in
supporting communities
in their negotiations with
companies and governments,
but have also been accused of
contributing to the escalation
of some conflicts by imposing
agendas that do not fully
represent the demands of local
communities.
7. The degree to which companies
and governments comply

with previous agreements
with local communities. A
government’s or company’s
failure to comply with a
previous commitment to
a community leaves locals
feeling betrayed and is often a
source of conflict. Trust that is
eroded is difficult to rebuild.
Communities often protest
the breach of contract with
force or violence.
Frequently underlying these
seven elements are the historic
economic disadvantage and social
and political exclusion of the
affected population. In many cases,
indigenous communities find
themselves suddenly negotiating
with large oil corporations for
access to basic education. Quasiisolated and forgotten groups see
these negotiations as their only
chance to draw attention to their
living conditions and improve their
livelihood, or at least gain access to
basic services. When the outcome
of the negotiations is perceived to
be unfair, communities affected by
energy projects may resort to protests
and sometimes violence to express
their dissatisfaction. Conflict in
these circumstances may become
an instrument for forcing some
kind of a solution to old grievances.
Increased coordination over shared
grievances by indigenous groups
at the international, national and
regional levels often exacerbates the
conflicts. Unless properly addressed,
discontent over historical injustices
could build and become a source
of democratic destabilization.
The deadly confrontations in the
Peruvian Amazon city of Bagua in
2009 offered a glimpse of this threat.

the regional level; revenue conflicts
at the national level; and local
conflicts with the potential to reach
national importance unless properly
addressed. Geopolitical and border
conflicts normally receive the most
attention from the general public
and the media. Revenue and local
conflicts, however, carry a greater
risk of destabilizing the region by
building on largely unresolved
inequalities, weak governance and
the increasing radicalization of the
indigenous movement.
Expanded energy projects are
necessary for economic growth
in Latin America, where installed
hydroelectric capacity remains very
low and large oil and gas reserves
await development. At the same
time, the infrastructure required
for such projects constitutes a
tremendous risk factor, as most of
the still-untapped oil and water
sources are in environmentally and
socially sensitive areas.
These social and environmental
fragilities, combined with the dire
economic reality and historical
marginalization of the communities
affected by energy development,
generate gradually more conflictive
situations. Unless addressed rapidly
and properly, these conflicts could
pose important challenges to Latin
America’s political stability and the
region’s prospects for economic
growth. ■
Patricia I. Vásquez is an independent
energy expert and former senior
fellow at the US Institute of Peace,
and an advisor on energy and
sustainable development issues.

Potential Political Repercussions
There are four types of energyrelated conflicts in Latin America:
geopolitical and border conflicts at
Hemisphere Volume 20

15

Feature

Latin America’s Nuclear Future
By Jorge Zanelli Iglesias

W

hat are the
challenges and
opportunities
for nuclear
power in Latin
America? Will nuclear energy
continue to be a marginal player
in electric generation in the region
(2% vs. 15% worldwide)? Are
the drivers to revive the nuclear
industry elsewhere in the world
going to be observed here as well?
Nuclear Power: World Outlook
As of 2010, 436 nuclear reactors
generated about 15% of the world’s
electricity. Hydraulic power, the
other major low-emissions energy
source, provided nearly 20%. But
while hydraulic power is constrained
by the availability of large rivers
and depends on climate, nuclear
power still has considerable room
for growth. After a modest start in
the 1950s and exponential growth
in the 60s, the nuclear industry
stagnated for 30 years in the western
world, primarily as a result of the
increase in interest rates caused by
the 1973 oil crisis.
During the stagnation period,
the nuclear industry developed
progressively simpler, safer and
more robust reactors. Streamlined
procedures improved performance,
helped boost load factors from 60%
to 90%, and extended service life by
about 30%. Since the first reactor
that produced enough power for four
light bulbs in 1951, the technology
has come a long way. Nowadays, the
nuclear industry is probably the safest
(fewer accidents per MW generated);
most reliable (load factors above
90%); economically attractive, even
16
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including decommissioning and
waste management (comparable with
coal-burning); and environmentally
friendly (tiny CO2 footprint) energy
source.
The last decade has witnessed
a revival of the nuclear industry
driven by increasing demand for
energy. In a context of uncertainty
in oil prices and supplies, especially
in the emerging economies, and

concerns over greenhouse gas
emissions, the supply security of
nuclear power has made it more
attractive. This has led to a rebound
in construction, especially in
East Asia, and prompted several
European governments to revise
their nuclear policies. China
and India plan to increase their
nuclear capacity by some 100,000
megawatts by 2020, and the US

Feature

Nuclear Regulatory Commission
has received applications for 30 new
nuclear reactors to go online in the
next decade.
A new concern is global warming,
presumably an effect of burning
fossil fuels, which in a few decades
returns to the atmosphere the CO2
that was captured by plants over
several hundred million years. Even
some environmentalists formerly
opposed to nuclear power advocate
the use of nuclear technology to
eliminate fossil fuels from electric
generation worldwide. If the
growing trend is maintained, nuclear
power could be generating more
than 20% of the world’s electricity
in 20 years.
Latin America’s Nuclear Countries
Argentina and Brazil, like other
world powers after World War II,
developed nuclear energy as an
outgrowth of military programs in
the 1950s. Nuclear programs in
these South American countries
were sparked by the hegemonic
ambitions of the authoritarian,
nationalistic governments headed
by strongmen Juan Domingo Perón
and Getúlio Vargas, respectively. In
the 1970s, military regimes in both
countries covertly attempted to
develop missiles and to master the
complete nuclear fuel cycle. Although
their civilian nuclear industries
did not require it, both succeeded
in controlling the heavy water
enrichment and production cycle.
Nuclear electricity was essentially a
cover for military programs rather
than a true attempt to secure the
energy supply. With the return to
democracy, both Argentina and
Brazil abandoned their military goals,
developing civilian nuclear power
programs that have safely and reliably
delivered 935MWe and 1,900MWe
to their respective grids.
Mexico, in contrast, never started
a military nuclear effort. In the early

1960s the government concluded
that, at prevailing uranium prices,
it made sense to sell oil abroad and
import nuclear fuel rather than
burn oil to produce electricity.
This led to the construction of
the Laguna Verde Plant in 1988,
which has successfully provided
some 1,330MWe to the Mexican
economy.
The 5,300 MW of nuclear
generation in these three countries
covers about 5% of their internal
demand and accounts for 2%
of Latin American electricity
generation. Argentina and Brazil are
completing construction of third
reactors (Atucha II and Angra III,
respectively). Mexico is expanding
the capacity of its Laguna Verde
facility by 20% and is considering
construction of eight new reactors
as part of plans to reduce its carbon
footprint. This vigorous growth,
which could triple output by
2025, has wide political support,
a big change from the opposition
the original plant encountered in
the1980s.
New Concerns, New Players
In recent years, several Latin
American governments have
expressed interest in starting new
nuclear programs. Apart from
Cuba, however, where efforts in
this direction were started and then
aborted, no new programs have been
launched since the 1980s. After so
many unfulfilled announcements,
and the abundance of hydraulic and
fossil fuel resources in the region,
those claims can reasonably be
dismissed as sheer advertising for
image-building, without a serious
commitment.
Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico,
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and
Bolivia are rich in fossil fuels; Brazil
has vast untapped hydroelectric
potential; Paraguay exports five
times the electricity it consumes;

and, until recently, Argentina
had a natural gas surplus. Such
abundance makes nuclear energy
unattractive as a short- or mediumterm option. However, as economic
growth forces up demand and fuel
prices, as CO2 emissions become
increasingly objectionable and
eventually taxed, and fewer rivers
remain untapped, burning fossil
fuels for electric generation will
become uneconomical, unpopular
and unethical. Sooner or later,
Latin American economies will
have to look for alternatives that
can provide base-load electricity
safely, reliably, affordably and
sustainably to replace today’s
primary sources: hydropower, coal
and gas. Renewables – wind, solar
and geothermal – are intermittent,
considerably more expensive and less
reliable than the standard primary
sources and, contrary to standard
opinion, not as environmentally
friendly with current technology.
Scale is also an issue: It takes
around 20,000 acres of wind
turbines to match the output of
a standard coal-burning plant. As
energy–storing technology evolves,
some nonconventional alternatives
should play an important role in
the future matrix, but which ones
and when remain open questions.
Since the only certain fact about
the future is the growing need for
energy, countries with limited energy
resources that could jeopardize their
economic future would be wise to
invest in a proven technology such as
nuclear, which could deliver energy
to the required scale at a reasonable
cost and in reasonable time.
Chile and Uruguay are seriously
considering nuclear power as an
alternative. These two countries are
net energy importers, with limited
fossil fuel deposits and little room
for growth in hydropower. They
seem the most likely candidates
to join the regional nuclear club.
Hemisphere Volume 20

17

Feature

Reaching this goal, however, is
a complex affair for any nation,
hinging on unpredictable factors
and internal and external political
barriers that must be overcome.
Challenges and Opportunities
Countries that intend to start
civilian nuclear power programs
must not only have the financial
resources to invest in the technology,
but must also be technologically
sophisticated and institutionally
mature, with the necessary legal and
regulatory government agencies.
These nations should also have a
safety culture that goes beyond
having enough manpower to operate
nuclear reactors, a regulatory
body and a minimal technological
network to support the nuclear
industry. They must have the human
resources trained for high standards
of safety and rigor.
Civilian nuclear power programs
require broad social consensus.
Both imaginary fears and legitimate
concerns about nuclear energy
must be addressed, and the longterm commitments cannot be
overlooked. The first power that
nuclear reactors generate brings with
it irradiated fuel containing highactivity, long half-life radionuclides
that must be kept in isolation for
several centuries. Although this
is not technologically difficult to
do, it underscores the fact that
starting a nuclear power program
requires having answers to questions
that might arise a hundred years
down the road. In participatory
democracies, this requires a
high level of public consensus
and governments that guarantee
transparency, thoroughness and
best practices through competent,
rigorous, independent and fully
empowered regulatory agencies.
Nuclear countries must also
satisfy the international community
with a clear commitment to
18
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peace. All Latin American and
Caribbean countries have ratified
the Tlatelolco and Nuclear NonProliferation treaties, but recent
ambiguous statements by Brazilian
authorities with regard to the
legitimacy of the military use of
nuclear energy have cast a shadow
over the civilian nature of that
country’s program. Venezuela’s
plans to join Iran’s nuclear efforts
have also raised concerns in the
international community. Although
there are no signs that Venezuela
has the technological knowhow or
the intention to become a rogue
state like North Korea, it is still a
matter of concern that Venezuela,
Brazil and Argentina have yet to
endorse the Additional Safeguards
Protocol to allow unimpeded
nuclear inspections.
Recurring international concerns
about terrorist groups getting hold
of fissile material to make weapons,
or spent fuel and other radioactive
material to produce “dirty bombs,”
are exaggerated given the enormous
technological difficulties involved in
building a working nuclear bomb
and the inefficiency of a dirty bomb
as terrorist propaganda.
Regional integration is probably
the key to ensuring viable, robust
and transparent nuclear programs.
International cooperation could help
newcomers establish their regulatory
infrastructures. The industry could
benefit from an extensive network
of advanced technology providers,
with training and certification of
operators and inspectors carried
out at regional centers. Integration
could also provide assurances to
all stakeholders of compliance
with non-proliferation agreements
and avoidance of the military
use of nuclear power, similar to
the ABAAC agreement between
Argentina and Brazil for the
enrichment of uranium. Electrical
integration of the region, like the

SIEPAC project in Central America
or similar efforts in the Southern
Cone, would make the grids more
stable, economically efficient and
robust under local or seasonal
climate fluctuations. Finally, an
integrated Latin American nuclear
energy effort could play a role
similar to that of EURATOM,
which started the European
economic integration that gave rise
to the EEC 40 years later.
The recent earthquake and
tsunami that struck Japan have
raised legitimate concerns about the
safety of the nuclear industry. The
accident at the Fukushima power
plant prompted antinuclear voices
demanding the suspension of new
reactor construction and possibly
reducing existing nuclear generation.
Although it is too soon to tell
whether human responsibilities
contributed to the magnitude of the
accident, the lessons learned from
this experience will be incorporated
into the next generation of nuclear
reactors, significantly improving the
safety and reliability of the nuclear
industry, in an evolution similar to
that of the aviation industry. The
nuclear industry will certainly suffer
in the short term as governments
and investors revise their plans
and the technology absorbs the
lessons learned. As the dust settles
in a scenario of increasing energy
demands, however, renewed growth
can be expected. The image of
nuclear energy will suffer in the
eyes of the public, but its safety
record will not change much from
its historical level, keeping it one of
the safest and most environmentally
friendly forms of electric
generation. ■
Jorge Zanelli Iglesias is a researcher
at the Centro de Estudios Científicos
(CES) in Valdivia, Chile. This is a
condensed and updated version of a
longer article.
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What Climate Change Means
for Latin America
By Paul Isbell

Compared to the US or China, each of which contributes 20% of the world’s annual greenhouse gas emissions, Latin America accounts for a mere
10%. Agriculture (a major source of methane) and deforestation account for nearly two-thirds of the region’s greenhouse gases.

L

atin America’s position
in the energy and
climate change landscape
generates unique
strategic policy choices.
Like Africa, Latin America has
contributed relatively little to climate
change, but the region is set to
absorb more than its fair share of
the environmental and geopolitical
consequences of the problem, leading
to a range of strategic incentives
and disincentives that require more
than mere replication of the policy
responses elsewhere.
Latin America is particularly
vulnerable to climate change due

to its geography. Much of Mexico
and Central America lies within the
hurricane belt, which now operates
with greater force and volatility as
a result of global warming. Latin
America’s low-lying coastal zones,
which include many of the region’s
largest urban areas, will come under
threat from warming-induced
rising sea levels. In addition, much
of South America’s agriculture
and urban activity depends on
water flowing from the Andean
glaciers, which are now in retreat.
This threatens the sustainability
of the region’s populations and
economies and, in particular, its

main low-carbon energy source –
hydroelectric power.
How such environmental
instability will interact with ongoing
geopolitical frictions and heightened
instability in different parts of the
region is far from clear. Climate
change is poised to impact Latin
America just as many of the region’s
economies are breaking away from
a traditional cyclical dependency
on the world’s core developed
economies. The region’s economies
are slowly but surely diversifying
their domestic production, internal
demand, and external trade
and financial linkages. Brazil in
Hemisphere Volume 20
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particular is emerging as a pioneer
in energy and climate policy. At
the same time, however, the region
remains vulnerable to traditional
maladies – from the oil curse to the
debt trap – that typically interact
destructively with the sources and
impacts of human-induced climate
change.
Compared to the United States
or China, each of which contributes
more than 20% of the world’s
annual greenhouse gas emissions,
Latin America’s impact is a mere
10%. In per capita terms, these
figures correspond to more than 23
metric tons per person in the US,
compared to just over 10 metric
tons in Latin America. This is down
from more than 13 metric tons 20
years ago.
Furthermore, Latin America’s
carbon footprint has a distinctive
structure and obeys a different
dynamic than in other parts of
the world. While CO2 emissions
from energy use make up nearly
two-thirds of global greenhouse gas
released from all sources, in Latin
America they account for less than a
third. Instead, agriculture (a major
source of methane) and changes
in land use patterns, including
livestock-driven deforestation,
account for nearly two-thirds of
the greenhouse gases the region
produces.
If we removed all greenhouse
gas contributions stemming from
changes in land use patterns,
the region’s share would drop to
around 6% (around 5 metric tons
per capita). The US contribution
in relative terms would remain at
more than 20% (22 metric tons
per capita). But if we discounted
all non-energy related greenhouse
gas emissions, Latin America’s
contribution would fall even further,
to between 3 and 4% of the global
total (compared to 19% from the
US), around four to five metric
20
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tons per capita. This is in line with
Chinese per capita energy-induced
CO2 emissions.
What this emissions profile
should tell policymakers about
Latin America is that energy
consumption there is less dirty (in
climate terms) than in most other
parts of the world. Although Latin
America is still more dependent
on petroleum, which comprises
44% of its energy mix compared
to 35% in the world as a whole,
it is less dependent on coal (4%
compared to a global average of
24%). Coal is by far the energy
source that emits the most CO2. In
its place, Latin America relies on
large-scale hydroelectric power for
approximately 25% of the region’s
primary energy mix. In Brazil,
the figure is 75%, an even greater
electricity share than France’s fabled
nuclear power, while in Paraguay
hydropower approaches 100% of
the electricity mix.
For policymakers, the battle
against deforestation is even more
important than decarbonization
of the energy economy in Latin
America. This is particularly true
in Brazil, where biofuels add even
more low-carbon energy – 25% of
all transportation fuels – on top of
hydroelectricity. But while Brazil’s
energy economy is relatively clean
in terms of carbon emissions, its
economy accounts for much of
the significantly higher level of
greenhouse gas emissions in the
region in total.
To some observers, all of this
suggests that the push toward
a post-fossil fuel energy future
is less urgent in Latin America
than in other parts of the world.
On the one hand, given the low
level of CO2 emissions stemming
from energy across the region,
even if Latin America completely
decarbonizes its energy economy
it will make little difference to

the rate of global greenhouse gas
accumulation in the atmosphere
(the key in this regard resides
in the US and in China). The
expansion of livestock agriculture,
on the other hand, which leads to
both increased methane emissions
and forest clearing-induced
CO2 accumulation, significantly
contributes to global warming.
Efforts to halt deforestation in
developing countries, such as
the REDD+ program, have been
recognized by the international
climate change community as
critical elements in the fight against
global warming. Unfortunately,
while Latin America has improved
on the land-use front, its
traditionally low energy-induced
carbon dioxide emissions have
increased significantly in recent
years, even if from a low base.
Some Latin American countries
may see little strategic gain in
undertaking the arduous and
costly effort of deploying lowcarbon energies to reduce global
emissions in time to avoid the worst
manifestations of climate change.
Yet many of the same countries
have much to gain from significant
efforts to pursue low-carbon energy
deployment, simply because such a
commitment is often the best way
to garner financing for the costly
mitigation efforts and even more
expensive climate adaptation they
will soon need. Even without the
threat of climate change, many
Latin American countries would see
strategic benefits from displacing
imported, high-priced fossil fuels
with domestic renewable and
other low-carbon energy sources,
reducing direct energy costs and
freeing themselves from potentially
destabilizing dependence on
unstable and unreliable sources. ■
Paul Isbell is a visiting senior fellow
at the Inter-American Dialogue.
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Central America’s Energy
Challenges
By Cristina Eguizábal

O

f the three poorest
countries in the
Americas, two
are in Central
America. With
the exception of Costa Rica and
Panama, poverty rates are high and
inequality is profound. Central
American countries spend much
of their resources on imported
hydrocarbons despite the fact
that the region’s main source of
energy for household use remains
firewood. This is even true of Belize
and Guatemala, the region’s only
oil producers. As a result, the seven
small economies of the region suffer
when oil prices are high, as was the
case in 2008.
Hydroelectricity, administered
by the state through public utilities
and transmission companies, has
dominated electricity generation in
the region. In the 1990s, economic
liberalization and privatization
reached the energy markets
and attracted foreign investors
to develop new power plants.
Investors preferred thermal (dieselpowered) plants as they were less
costly and faster to build than
hydropower plants, let alone river
dams. In the 1980s, approximately
75% of the region’s energy came
from hydroelectric dams; that
percentage has since dropped to
less than 50%. In 2009, according
to ECLAC, 47.5% of electricity
in Central America was generated
by hydraulic power, 37.3% came
from oil, 7.9% was geothermal,
4.4% was generated by sugar cane,

Guatemalan woman carrying a load of firewood from the slopes of the mountain to her home. In the
Quiche region, more than 90 percent of families rely on firewood for cooking.

1.8% came from coal and 1%
was wind-powered. Of that total,
60.8% of electricity was generated
from renewable sources. As a result,
the region’s energy matrix looks

fairly diversified, although much
work remains to be done for the
countries to reach energy output
levels capable of maintaining
economic growth and lifting their
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Windmill farm on the shores of Lake Nicaragua. The Concepción Volcano on Ometepe Island dominates the background.
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populations up from poverty
while reducing the proportion of
hydrocarbon-generated electricity.
Energy profiles vary among
Central American countries: 95%
of Costa Rica’s energy production
comes from renewable sources
(mostly river dams), while in
Nicaragua the figure is 26.6%. In
El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama
and Honduras the proportion of
renewable energy is around 50%. All
of the countries in the region need
to expand their power-generating
capacity quickly to extend the
electrical grid to rural areas and
complete the electrification of
their territory. Out of a total of 40
million people living in Central
America, approximately 10 million
do not have electricity in their
homes and almost 20 million still
use firewood for cooking. The
challenge confronting Central
American countries is their need
to reduce reliance on traditional
biomass sources of energy –e.g.,
firewood—which are not only big
polluters but also contribute to
the region’s rapid deforestation. It
is imperative to build renewable
energy-generating capacity while
reducing emissions of greenhouseeffect gases.
Central America’s hydroelectric
potential is far from exhausted. Big
dams are not only costly in financial
terms, however; by dramatically
changing the social and ecological
systems of an entire region, they can
also become costly politically. The
Brazilian conglomerate QuierozGalvão-Electrobras is building a
new dam, Tumarín, in Nicaragua’s
South Atlantic Autonomous
region. The dam will revert to
public property after 30 years, but
the communities that surround
Tumarín –which claim they were
not consulted about the project—
and environmentalist groups allege
that it will negatively impact the

entire Río Grande de Matagalpa
watershed.
The Chalillo hydropower project
in Belize provides another example.
Since 2005, Belize Sugar Industries
(BSI) has been working on a plant
that runs on both oil and sugar cane
bagasse (92% renewable). It will
produce 30 megawatts of power, of
which 25 megawatts, representing
20% of Belize’s national grid, are to
be sold directly to the state-owned
Belize Electricity Limited. The
remaining five will be for use at the
BSI factory.
Other renewable public-private
partnerships in energy projects
include wind parks in Costa Rica
(Plantas Eólicas de Costa Rica)
and Nicaragua (Amayo I and II),
which are already operational, and
Cerro de Hula in Honduras, still
under construction. El Salvador is
Central America’s larger producer
of geothermal energy. Two plants
in Ahuachapán and Berlín generate
approximately one-quarter of the
country’s total output.
At the other end of the continuum
are small-scale renewable energy
initiatives that allow poor rural
populations to avoid the need for
fixed lines. There are no reliable data
on the spread of off-grid renewable
energy on a small scale, but a large
number of these systems are being
installed. Small solar projects,
underground biogas chambers and
“mini” hydroelectric dams deliver
electricity at a price that even the
poor can afford and are sufficient to
power cell phones, fans and highefficiency light bulbs. These initiatives
will not replace the need for the more
reliable electricity delivery systems
necessary to power major appliances
such as refrigerators, but until that
happens, they will make life easier for
millions of people, particularly poor
women and children.
The most ambitious energy
initiative involves not power

generation but power efficiency, by
linking the power grids of Panama,
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras,
El Salvador and Guatemala.
After 20 years of discussion,
Central American governments
finally began construction of the
Central American Interconnection
System (SIEPAC) in 2006; the
interconnection of Panama and
Costa Rica became operational
on October 25, 2010. As
part of the Puebla Panama
development initiative (which
includes Colombia as well), the
Regional Electrical Market plans
to complement SIEPAC with
electrical interconnections between
Guatemala and Mexico, Guatemala
and Belize, and Panama and
Colombia. Supporters of the project
argue that the interconnection of
the nations’ electrical transmission
grids will optimize shared use of
hydroelectricity, reduce operating
costs and create a large enough
market to attract foreign investment
in power generation and transmission
systems. Some critics fear that
SIEPAC will facilitate electricity
exports to Mexico and Colombia
but not expand access in Central
America, and others voice concerns
about the associated environmental
and social costs of large hydropower
facilities. Supporters and critics alike
stress the weakness of the region’s
regulatory environment at all levels,
national and regional.
Central American countries must
expand their electricity generation
considerably in the coming years.
To do so responsibly, they need
to establish a truly diverse energy
pattern based on financial and
environmental sustainability. ■
Cristina Eguizábal is a professor
of international relations and the
director of the Latin American
and Caribbean Center at Florida
International University.
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Why the United States and
Cuba Collaborate

(and What Could Happen If They Don’t)
By Jorge Piñón

I

f Cuba’s suspected but yet
undiscovered hydrocarbon
reserves are proven real, it will
take between three and five
years to develop them fully.
Production volumes would have to
reach more than 200,000 barrels
per day to have the same positive
economic impact currently derived
from foreign oil subsidies. If this
occurs, significant revenues from oil,
natural gas and sugarcane ethanol
would integrate Cuba into global
and regional markets within the next
five years.
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International oil companies such
as Spain’s Repsol, Norway’s Statoil
Norsk Hydro and Brazil’s Petrobras
are actively exploring Cuba’s
Gulf of Mexico waters. Cuban
authorities have invited United
States oil companies to participate
in developing the island’s offshore
oil and natural gas resources,
but US law does not allow this.
Although US oil, oil equipment and
service companies have the capital,
technology and operational knowhow to explore, produce and refine
Cuba’s potential reserves in a safe

and responsible manner, the almost
five-decade old unilateral political
and economic embargo keeps them
on the sidelines.
Cuba currently relies on heavily
subsidized oil from Venezuela for
two-thirds of its petroleum needs.
This supply contributes to the
Cuban government’s ability to
maintain a politically antagonistic
and belligerent position towards
the US.
The collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991 made Cuba aware of the
political and economic risks and
consequences of depending on a
single source of imported oil. Only
when Cuba diversifies suppliers and
develops its offshore hydrocarbon
resources, estimated by the United
States Geological Survey at 5.5
million barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas, will it
have the economic independence
to consider political and economic
reforms. It is in the US interest
to develop a new policy toward
the island based on constructive
engagement to support the
emergence of a Cuban state in which
Cubans themselves can determine the
political and economic future of their
country through democratic means.
Cuba is about to embark on an
18-month oil exploration drilling
program to validate the presence of
recoverable hydrocarbon reserves.
US support of such endeavors would
be beneficial in the framework of a
constructive engagement policy.
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The Deepwater Horizon drilling
semi-submersible incident and
the resulting catastrophic oil
spill demonstrate the urgency of
developing a policy of energy and
environmental cooperation between
the United States and Cuba. As
Cuba develops its deepwater oil
and natural gas potential, the
possible consequences of a spill
call for proactive planning by both
countries to minimize or avoid an
environmental disaster.
To respond effectively to an
oil-related marine accident, any
company operating in Cuba would
require immediate access to US oil
services companies for the nearinstant technology and know-how
needed to halt and limit damage to
the marine environment. Obviously,
the establishment of working
relations between the US and Cuba
in the area of marine environmental
protection would assist enormously
in the contingency planning and
cooperation necessary for an early
and effective response to an oil spill.
The United States and Cuba
are already parties to a number of
multilateral oil pollution agreements,
such as the 1973 International
Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)
and the 1983 Convention for the
protection and Development of
the Marine Environment in the
Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena
Convention). Both agreements
address prevention of pollution of
the marine environment by ships
from operational or accidental
causes. The 1990 International
Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response and
Cooperation also offers a precedent
for cooperation. The convention
is designed to encourage and
facilitate international cooperation
and mutual assistance in preparing
for and responding to major oil
pollution incidents. Signatory

nations are tasked with developing
and maintaining adequate
capabilities to deal with such an
emergency. In the case of Cuba and
the United States, the capabilities
must be transnational, as there is no
barrier to the movement of oil from
one country’s waters to another’s.
The United States, therefore, must
develop appropriate regulatory and
procedural frameworks for the free
movement of equipment, personnel
and expertise between the two
countries as part of any oil spill
response.
The 1980 Agreement of
Cooperation between the United
States and Mexico Regarding
Pollution of the Marine
Environment by Discharges of
Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous
Substances (MEXUS Plan) provides
the foundation for a similar protocol
with Cuba. This would include
the establishment of joint response
teams, coordinating roles, rapid
incident notification mechanisms,
joint operations centers and
communication procedures, along
with regular exercises and meetings.
The United States government,
irrespective of the current embargo,
has the power to license the sale,

lease or loan of emergency relief and
reconstruction equipment and the
travel of expert personnel to Cuba
following an oil spill.
Cuba’s long-term energy
challenges will be a consequence
of its future economic growth and
rising standard of living within
a market environment. This
anticipated growth will depend
largely on the development of
a competitively priced, readily
available and environmentally sound
long-term energy plan. Cuban
energy policy should embrace
energy conservation, modernization
of the energy infrastructure, and
balance in sourcing oil/gas supplies
and renewable energy sources that
protect the island’s environment.
The country would benefit from the
guidance of a variety of partners,
including the United States. ■
Jorge R. Piñón is a visiting research
fellow at the Latin American and
Caribbean Center’s Cuban Research
Institute at FIU. The opinions
expressed in this paper are among
the recommendations resulting from
the Brookings Institute April 2010
seminar, “U.S. Policy toward a Cuba
in Transition.”
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Challenges of Designing an
Optimal Petroleum Fiscal Model
in Latin America
By Roger Tissot

T

he ability to replace
hydrocarbon reserves
is influenced by the
level of investment in
exploration activities.
Governments have two options for
conducting exploration activity: 1)
investing in exploration activities
directly; or 2) asking private
companies to make the investments.
In the first case, the ability of
the entity – usually the National
Oil Company (NOC) – to make
investments depends on the skill
level of the country’s workforce, the
government’s financial capabilities,
its aversion to risk, and the level of
financial and strategic independence
of the NOC from other government
authorities.
Political authorities tend to
be risk averse and would prefer
to use scarce financial resources
for projects aimed at improving
social conditions or economic
development. Their investment
preferences are also influenced
by political ideology and the
preferences of their constituencies.
The NOC has to compete with
other government authorities for the
funding to make its investments.
The more dependent on NOC
revenues the government is, the less
independence will be granted to the
NOC. In this case, the NOC is more
likely to be risk averse, focus most
investments on sustaining production
from existing wells, and implement
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only modest exploration activities in
the most prospective areas.
Sometimes NOCs manage to
achieve a high level of independence
from the government despite
being their main source of cash.
The sustainability of NOC
“independence” depends upon
three factors: 1) its ability to meet
the government’s financial needs;
2) its capacity to produce and
replace reserves efficiently; and 3)
endorsement of NOC strategic
activities by top-level political
authorities. If these conditions are
not met, the result is often a cashstarved and risk-averse NOC unable
to carry out exploration alone.
The other option is for
governments to offer the rights
for developing the resource via
concessions to international oil
companies (IOCs), or to partner
with them in exchange for a share
of production or profits. The
option selected depends on the
government’s choice of petroleum
fiscal models.
The different “families” of
models represent legal contracts
or agreements covering rights
granted over a period of time and
for an agreed level of activity. The
difference between these systems
mostly involves the mechanics of
risk and reward sharing between
the contractor and the government.
Fiscal models can be more or less
progressive depending on when

the rents are captured: the later
the payment is required, the more
progressive the system is.
The main challenge in the
design of optimal fiscal system is
to achieve alignment of different
and sometimes diverging objectives
between the government and the
IOC. The government’s primary
objective is to maximize the value
of its petroleum resources while
attracting sufficient interest from
IOCs to invest in E&P activities.
IOCs in turn seek to ensure that
the rate of return on the capital
employed is consistent with the
project’s risk and with the strategic
objectives of the corporation.
Latin American Experience
Latin America has been a fertile
ground for petroleum fiscal models.
Whether the region’s policies are
open or closed usually obeys shifts
in the political pendulum from
populism to economic orthodoxy.
In the 1990s, therefore, Latin
America adopted market-oriented
models, reduced government take,
ended NOC monopolies and,
in some cases, privatized them.
The private sector response was
positive, resulting in rapid growth
of reserves and production. Most of
the fiscal models, however, failed to
respond to the steep price increases.
That failure coincided with the
rise of new populist regimes that
relied on resource nationalism as
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Oil Reserves and Production
Figure 1 shows the evolution
of petroleum reserves in Latin
America from the 1990s through
2009. Reserves increased modestly
(0.7% on average) from 1990 to
2005, followed by a drastic jump
since then.
Figure 2 shows the change in oil
reserves in the main oil-producing
countries of Latin America between
2004 and 2009. Venezuela explains
most of the jump in reserves over
the last few years. This is not
“new oil” but rather a change in
the definition of already recorded
reserves from the heavy crude oil
Orinoco fields. Brazil has increased
its reserves almost constantly in
the last two decades, due in part
to more active exploration efforts
by Petrobras, the Brazilian NOC,
and IOCs since the opening of the
sector a decade ago. Brazil has also
captured international headlines
since 2008 due to huge discoveries
of pre-salt oil, described as a “game
changer” for Brazil’s petroleum
outlook. The country is expected to
become an important oil exporter in
the next decade.
Latin America’s oil production
peaked at 10.65 million b/d in
2005. Since then, production has

Figure 1
South America and Mexico Oil Reserves (billion b) and % Change

Figure 2

Changes in Latin American Oil Reserves 2009-2004 (billion b)

Latin A
America Change Reserves Billion b

a key component of their political
platforms.
Since this most recent “turn to
the left,” Latin America has faced
two very different paths with regard
to oil policy. The first favors state
corporatism and maximization of
rents even at the cost of investments
and additional reserves. This is the
case of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador
and, to a certain degree, Brazil
and Argentina. The second path
advocates strengthening marketoriented models, resulting in a
boom in investments in Colombia,
Peru and, to a lesser extent, Trinidad
& Tobago.

Figure 3

Changes in Oil Production 2004-2009
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slowly declined to less than 10
million b/d. Average production
changes since 2005 on a country
basis show Mexico with the biggest
decline, followed by Venezuela,
Argentina and Ecuador. Gains were
made in Brazil, Colombia and Peru.
Petroleum Policy Outlook
According to a recent report by
the Fitch Rating agency, capital
expenditures by the largest five
Latin American NOCs could reach
US$550 bn in the next five years.
Coinciding with the ambitious
expansion plans is a deterioration
of fiscal balances in the region due
to increased spending caused by
the fiscal stimulus in 2009 and
natural disasters during the 2010
rainy season.
Countries that were seen as
“business friendly” have become
victims of their own success. Access
to land is becoming more expensive
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and governments have imposed
higher taxes and royalties and/or
stricter qualifying requirements
for IOCs. Resource-nationalist
countries have experienced a drastic
decline in production and, in
some cases, reserves. The economic
sustainability of these countries
is tied to new investments. There
is uncertainty about local NOCs’
abilities to meet the investment
challenge, while foreign investors
would expect a reward attractive
enough to compensate for political
and fiscal risks.
In the last decade, some
countries have successfully
increased their hydrocarbon
reserves, with high rents for
governments, increased investment
and attractive rates of return for
investors. It would be tempting
to “copy” the fiscal models
of successful countries, but a
successful fiscal model must reflect

the political, social and economic
characteristics of the host country.
In some countries, allowing
concessions to IOCs may be seen
as highly offensive, for historical
reasons. In others, the need to
secure new reserves to postpone
the need to import oil is a
sufficient incentive to grant IOCs
attractive fiscal conditions.
The main challenge in Latin
America is to design petroleum
fiscal models that are flexible
enough to incorporate price
volatility and political change and
stable enough to allow private
investors to focus on long-term
development. ■
Roger Tissot is an economist and
independent consultant focusing
on Latin American energy policy,
markets and strategy, advising mostly
Canadian and international oil and
gas companies.
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Petrobras: The Unique Structure
behind Latin America’s Best
Performing Oil Company
Genaro Arriagada and Chris Cote

B

razil’s oil and gas
giant Petrobras stands
among the world’s most
successful businesses,
admired by the public as
well as by private and state-owned
national and transnational oil
companies. Petrobras today is active
in 23 countries in the exploration,
production, refining, distribution
and sale of oil, gas and energy, as
well as petrochemicals, biofuels and
electricity.
Latin America’s most successful
oil company owes its success at
least in part to Brazil’s condition
as an oil-poor country with a
government that does not see it as a
cash cow. Unlike the other stateowned powerhouses in the region,
Mexico’s PEMEX and Venezuela’s
PDVSA, Petrobras grew gradually
on a reputation for efficiency,
ensuring crucial funding from
government and other sources. The
recent discovery of pre-salt oil now
presents the company with the
opportunity to exploit immense
new reserves.
A Remarkable Success
After recovering quickly from
the recent financial crisis, Petrobras
is considered the world’s eighth
largest corporation and is often
described as Latin America’s bestmanaged company.
Brazil’s oil and natural gas
production are rising: Oil production
is projected to increase by 60% by

Petrobras headquarters, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
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2014 and 130% by 2020 (compared
to 2008). Natural gas production
is estimated to increase by 100 and
245%, respectively. Company reports
estimate that in 2014 Petrobras
will produce 3 million barrels of oil
per day and 623,000 barrels of oil
equivalent (boe) in natural gas.
Petrobras’s investment is
enormous. Its 2010-2014 Business
Plan calls for an investment of $224
billion (some $45 billion per year),
more than five times the investment
level of PDVSA, according to
independent estimates.
Petrobras’s efficiency compares
exceedingly well to oil companies
of similar size, although accurate
comparisons are difficult as most
similar sized national oil companies
(NOCs) —the majority in the
Persian Gulf—do not provide
audited figures. Industry analysts
believe that Petrobras vastly
outperforms all of them. Petrobras
also ranks exceptionally high when
compared with the supermajors.
Statists vs. Free Enterprisers
The history of Petrobras is rife
with tension, largely between those
who wanted a fully state-owned
enterprise (“statists”) and those who
envisioned Petrobras as a private
company (“free enterprisers”).
The Brazilian government
cemented Petrobras’s status as a
state institution with several laws
between the 1940s and 1960s, and
the Federal Constitution of 1988,
which enacted a state monopoly
over all aspects of the hydrocarbons
industry, put Petrobras firmly in
state hands.
After several unsuccessful
attempts in the early 1990s, reform
proponents finally had some
success under the presidency of
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. A
1995 Constitutional amendment
authorized the federal government
“to outsource oil and gas activities
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under state monopoly to private or
government-owned companies.”
Two years later, Congress set a
new industry framework segregating
Petrobras’s business and regulatory
roles. Petrobras kept the former
while the latter was transferred to
a new National Petroleum Agency
(ANP), effective in January 1998.
The interaction between Petrobras
and the ANP is among the keys to
understanding the success of Brazil’s
oil policy.
The ANP’s ample powers include
the awarding of exploration and
production bids for oil, natural gas
and other liquid fuel concessions;
approving the import, export and
transportation of natural gas, oil
and its derivatives; and playing a
regulatory, oversight and disputesettlement role in substantive
cases. While maintaining a state
monopoly on oil and gas, Brazil
grants exploration and production
concessions to Petrobras, private
companies and joint efforts. In
January 2002, the country also
deregulated imports, exports and
prices.
A Very Special Government
Corporation
The recurring conflict between
statists and free enterprisers, which
has never been fully resolved, is
fundamental to understanding
how Petrobras became a sui generis
national oil company. Petrobras
has dual status as a government
corporation with a crucial role in
Brazilian growth and as a dividendpaying private company.
Private involvement in Petrobras
would not have been possible
without a legal framework
guaranteeing government control.
Brazil shares with many other
countries a nationalistic concern
about oil resources, especially with
regard to selling into foreign hands.
Rather than risk denationalization

of the industry, Law 9478 of 1997
ensured that private shareholders
had practically no non-economic
rights, especially over management
function, by separating stock
into voting common shares and
non-voting preferred shares. It
also required state ownership of
50%-plus-one of voting shares. A
complementary 1999 law extended
the possibility of stock ownership
to foreign companies and
individuals. Foreign-owned stock
now exceeds the share in private
Brazilian hands.
State Business
A nine-member board of
directors heads Petrobras. Seven
members are governmentappointed, one represents nongovernment minority common
shareholders, and another is elected
by preferred shareholders. The
board is made up of cabinet-level
officials (President Dilma Rousseff
was previously a member), former
military officials and academics,
all with close or direct ruling party
ties. One responsibility of the CEO
is to propose a slate of six general
managers for board approval or
rejection. Along with the CEO,
these general managers make up
the executive board that runs the
company. All board members
except the CEO have had at least
30 years of experience in Petrobras.
Petrobras works closely with
Congress and the administration.
State oversight is exercised through
legislative approval of multiyear plans that establish general
company goals and budgetary
and investment guidelines. The
plan helps entrench in law a
medium-term budget timeframe
free from Finance Ministry fiat.
Petrobras operational, economic and
government policy are harmonized
through executive approval of a
Global Expense Program.
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Oil drilling platform off the coast of Brazil.

Private Investment and Oversight
Private ownership in Petrobras has
expanded dramatically in the last
decade. The number of shareholders
grew by 153,000 between 2000
and 2008, and today one million
individuals hold shares in Petrobrasrelated securities.
Privatization proponents often
claim that companies are more
efficient and profitable in private
hands. Petrobras has performed
outstandingly in state hands while
keeping the private sector in the role
of a mere investor. Placing stock
in private hands, however, had a
fundamental effect on efficiency. It
made Petrobras subject to the same
oversight standards that apply to
private multinationals, including the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, with audits and
oversight conducted by a securities
commission. The presence of private
shareholders also serves as a check
on government attempts to milk
NOCs for cash.

Opportunities and Challenges in
Pre-Salt
When the pre-salt oil reserves—
estimated to contain 50 billion
boe—were discovered off Brazil’s
southeast coast in 2006 and 2007,
the Lula administration quickly
moved to bring the oil under more
direct state control. The government
passed four laws in 2010 that
effectively limit foreign participation
and guarantee Petrobras a majority
hand in production.
The first law created a new, stateowned company, Pré-Sal Petróleo
S.A. (PPSA), to manage pre-salt
production sharing contracts
entered into by the Ministry of
Mines and Energy. The second
authorized the government to
cede Petrobras exploration and
production rights to the equivalent
of 5 billion boe in the pre-salt
in exchange for a company share
package whose value is set by law.
The third made Petrobras the

sole operator of pre-salt projects
and gave it a 30% minimum
stake in each. Finally, the fourth
law created a social fund that
will invest pre-salt profits in
education, anti-poverty initiatives,
the environment, science and
technology.
This legislation—especially
Petrobras’s required operatorship in
each project—presents an enormous
opportunity to increase production
levels over the next decade, but
it also demands of Petrobras a
high level of capitalization, skilled
labor and management, technical
expertise and efficiency. While
Petrobras is widely considered to
be capable and experienced enough
to tackle the pre-salt, the amount
of new production projects coming
online will test the company’s
human resource capacity and could
undermine the sound management
and organization that have brought
it success up to this point. Critics
of greater state control over the
pre-salt are also concerned about the
loss of competition and resulting
inefficiencies that may arise.
These obstacles notwithstanding,
Petrobras is well positioned to
take on the pre-salt projects. Its
investment is on the rise, and capital
inflows are increasing from foreign
and domestic sources. The technical
challenges are surmountable and will
give the company greater experience
in ultra-deepwater fields, cementing
its position as the most successful
and experienced deepwater driller.
Brazil is already self-sufficient in
oil production and consumption.
When all of the pre-salt projects
come online—probably around
2020—Petrobras should become a
major oil exporter. ■
Genaro Arriagada is a non-resident
senior fellow and Chris Cote is a
program assistant for economics at the
Inter-American Dialogue.
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Argentina’s Energy Pricing
Challenges
By Pablo Fernández-Lamela

A

rgentina’s most
immediate energy
challenge is
pricing—a situation
it has in common to
varying degrees with many other
Latin American countries. Since
2002, the Argentine government
has capped the price of oil, gas
and electricity substantially
below market levels. The result
has been a sharp drop in energy
investments, rising consumer
demand and growing subsidies.
The government has taken some
measures to address the situation
but the central problem persists:
To attract investment, reduce
wasteful consumption and increase
hydrocarbon reserves, Argentina
needs to let markets determine
most energy prices.
For the past two decades,
Argentina has been a net energy
exporter, but low prices, declining
production and rising domestic
demand have brought the country
close to becoming a net energy
importer. Oil output decreased by
27% between 1998 and 2010, and
gas production has declined by 10%
since 2004. Oil exports dropped
by 64% from 2001 to 2009; gas
exports plummeted by 88% from
2004 to 2009. Proven reserves of oil
declined 22% in the last 10 years
and gas reserves have fallen by 55%.
In the 1990s, Argentina shifted
its heavily state-managed energy
sector to private ownership and
introduced a series of other energyrelated reforms. State oil, gas and
electricity companies were mostly
32

Hemisphere Volume 20

privatized and new policies and
regulations promoted foreign
investment in energy companies.
Production of oil, gas and electricity
went up, while costs per unit came
down. Argentina became an energy
exporter.
Since the country’s 2001-2002
economic collapse, the Argentine
government has kept energy prices
artificially low. The price of oil is
70% of its international reference
price. Gas and electricity prices
have fared worse at only 20% and
30% of international references.
Sustaining low consumer prices
(which leads to inefficiently high
use) requires the government to
subsidize imports during months of
elevated demand, with major fiscal
consequences. During the first three
quarters of 2010, the Argentine
government spent approximately
$4.5 billion on energy subsidies, or
about 1.3% of GDP. From 2002
to 2009, oil and gas subsidies cost

the Argentine government $55
billion. Energy subsidies have
also been a source of friction in
Argentina’s external relations; for
example, high domestic usage
allowed the Argentine government
to halt exports of natural gas to its
neighbor, Chile.
Raising energy prices is an
extraordinarily sensitive political
matter in Argentina, as it is in many
other Latin American countries, but
it is essential for the health of the
energy sector and for the country’s
longer-term development. Without
higher prices, neither foreign
nor domestic investment will be
available for energy exploration
or production, and subsidies will
continue to drain Argentina’s fiscal
resources. ■
Pablo Fernández-Lamela is a Master
of Public Administration candidate at
Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy
School of Government.

Commentary

Energy Consumption: Challenges
and Opportunities of Urbanization
By Heidi Jane Smith

L

atin America and the
Caribbean is the most
urbanized region in the
developing world. Of
the mega cities with
populations of five million or more,
eight are located in this region,
and the World Bank estimates this
number to increase to 15 by 2030.
Faced with the challenges of rapid
urbanization, a number of cities
have developed innovative ways
to deal with increased waste, air
pollution and the rising cost of
energy. The transportation systems,
sanitation sites and waste-to-energy
models developed in Latin American
cities have been replicated around
the world.
When the southern Brazilian city
of Curitiba began growing rapidly
in the 1960s, Mayor Jaime Lerner
and his planning team restructured
the city’s traffic flow to reduce cars
in the downtown area. Curitiba
lacked the funding for a subway
system, so the team designed a
system of express lanes to speed
buses through traffic. The system
saves around 27 million auto trips
annually and approximately 27
million liters of fuel. As a result,
Curitiba uses 30% less fuel per
capita than any other Brazilian
city of its size and has one of the
lowest rates of air pollution in the
country. Curitiba residents spend
only about 10% of their income on
travel, much less than the national
average, ensuring accessibility for
low-income residents.
Bogotá replicated much of
Curitiba’s transportation ideas when

it created its own rapid transit
bus system, the TransMilenio.
Project development received
unprecedented sub-national
financing from the Inter-American
Development Bank. Former Mayor
Enrique Peñalosa, who presided
over the initial project, is now
advising other cities interested in
building rapid transit bus programs
of their own.
A metropolitan giant of 20
million inhabitants, São Paulo has
used international cooperation
from the EU and US to provide
clean technologies around the
city. Its waste-to-energy plants
reduce approximately three
million tons of municipal waste
every year. By using a thermal
treatment to decompose the
garbage, these plants generate
approximately 750,000 tons of fuel
oil. The decomposition processes
within landfills create anaerobic
molecules that are absorbed into
the atmosphere as H2O instead
of greenhouse gases. With more
than 13 million tons of CO2equivalent savings, waste-to-energy
technologies are of particular
interest for climate change
policymakers.
Monterrey’s sanitation system was
in the spotlight when Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton visited this
northern Mexican city in March
2009. The project is operated by a
public-private partnership between
Bioelectrical Monterrey, S.A. de
C.V., the government of Nuevo
León state, and the System for
the Handling and Processing of

Organic Waste (SIMEPRODE), a
decentralized government agency.
The renewable energy project has
the capacity to capture 12 MW
of electricity per day, sufficient to
generate overnight public lighting
for seven municipalities. According
to SIMEPRODE, the plant has
generated more than 400,000 MWh
of power and avoided 85,000 tons
of greenhouse gas emissions, or
1,800,000 tons of CO2. The effect is
equivalent to planting 970 hectares
of forest.
Around the world, the rapid
growth of cities is exacerbating
global warming, with as much
as 78% of total greenhouse gas
emissions generated in urban areas.
This transformation has enormous
implications from an energy and
climate perspective: Buildings
alone account for up to 40% of
the energy consumption of some
countries, urban development
patterns affect emissions from
transportation, and solid waste and
sanitation systems are significant
sources of greenhouse gases. In
some cases, however, the pressures
of urbanization have provoked
a response from cities to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. As
the Latin American cases above
illustrate, how cities develop and
respond to energy challenges today
will have an indelible impact on
the world’s carbon footprint in the
future. ■
Heidi Jane Smith is a PhD candidate
in Public Administration at Florida
International University.
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Commentary

PetroCaribe: Welcome Relief for
an Energy-Poor Region
By Chris Cote

T

he international
price of oil has an
enormous impact
on the economies
of the energy-poor
countries of Central America and
the Caribbean, nearly all of which
are substantial importers of fossil
fuels. Venezuela has been the
region’s lone source of relief from
the skyrocketing prices of recent
years. It created PetroCaribe in June
2005 to help Central American and
Caribbean governments finance
their oil imports.
Today, PetroCaribe, which is
managed by Venezuela’s national
oil company, PDVSA, serves 17
of the 24 Central America and
Caribbean countries, excluding
Barbados, El Salvador, Panama, and
Trinidad & Tobago (the region’s
only energy exporter). Although
questions have been raised about
PDVSA’s reporting, the Venezuelan
oil company’s own figures show
PetroCaribe supplied the region with
approximately 160,000 barrels per
day on average from 2007 through
2009. This amounted to nearly
20% of Central America’s and the
Caribbean’s oil supply—although
half of the total went to Cuba.
The recipient countries benefit
most from PetroCaribe’s special
financing. As the price of petroleum
increases, so does the amount
PetroCaribe is prepared to finance.
The terms become particularly
generous when the price of oil is
above $40 per barrel, which will
likely be the case for some time
into the future. The scheme is an

34

Hemisphere Volume 20

Venezuelan President
Hugo Chávez and
Cuban Acting President
Raúl Castro on
December 21, 2007,
in Cienfuegos, Cuba,
at the fourth summit
of PetroCaribe, an
initiative created by
Venezuela to provide oil
to Caribbean neighbors
at preferential prices.
Photo: Adalberto Roque/
AFP/Getty Images.

intelligent one: the higher the price
of oil, the greater Central America
and the Caribbean’s need for
help, but rising prices also expand
Venezuela’s capacity to assist. When
prices are low, Venezuela cannot
help much, but the region also
requires less assistance.
Besides financing oil purchases,
PetroCaribe has promised to
contribute to the cost of developing
and repairing refineries and other
infrastructure. So far, repair of
the Cienfuegos refinery in Cuba
is the only project that has been
completed. Plans call for building
or repairing some 20 refineries in
the next 10 years. Petrocaribe has
also pledged to contribute to a food
security fund for Central America
and the Caribbean when oil prices
exceed $100 a barrel.
PetroCaribe has been a
constructive way for Venezuela to
gain political influence. Venezuela
has been criticized for seeking
political advantage from its support
of PetroCaribe, but this is an
objective of almost all foreign aid,

regardless of the source. Moreover,
Venezuela has gained a measure of
good will across the Caribbean and
Central America as a result of its
PetroCaribe mechanism.
The longer-term prospects of
PetroCaribe are uncertain. Despite
high prices, the Venezuelan oil
industry is deteriorating. PDVSA’s
oil production has fallen by
approximately one-third since
1997 (from 3.30 to 2.20 mbd).
Exports fared even worse; due to
rising domestic demand, Venezuela’s
shipments abroad dropped by onehalf (from 2.90 to 1.50 mbd). There
is no question that PetroCaribe has
become more costly to Venezuela,
with shipments from PDVSA
through PetroCaribe continuing to
rise as a share of total oil exports.
In response, Venezuela appears
to be tightening the terms of its
PetroCaribe sales. ■
Chris Cote is a program assistant
for economics at the Inter-American
Dialogue, where he specializes in
energy and Brazil-related issues.
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Over the last decade, Venezuela has exerted an influence on the Western
Hemisphere and global international relations well beyond what one might
expect from a country of 26.5 million people. Since coming to power in 1999,
President Hugo Chávez has used the windfall of high oil prices to remake
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regime’s power tenuous.
Foreword by Cristina Eguizábal, Director, Latin American and Caribbean
Center, Florida International University.
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